The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) Is Not a Leave Act, Or Is It?
This week the US Supreme Court let stand a decision from America’s heartland that has been closely watched. The Severson case arose from an employee with a back issue who had surgery at the end of his FMLA leave and was unable to return to work for another three months. He was terminated. Severson sued, claiming his rights under the ADA were violated when he was not allowed extra leave. The Seventh Circuit US Court of Appeals which covers Illinois, Indiana and Wisconsin disagreed. The Court found that ADA is an anti-discrimination statute, not a medical leave law.
What does this mean for employers? The Circuit Courts are split and a ruling from the Supreme Court would have been helpful. Unless and until that occurs, we recommend employers continue to utilize a case by case analysis in determining if leave is a reasonable accommodation under the ADA. The interactive process with the employee and analysis of undue burden is the best practice for each instance. The trend favoring employees in these cases may be waning, but the risks in denying accommodation across the board are tremendous. Stay the course: treat the ADA as proscribed by law.
If you have any questions on ADA and FMLA leaves, please contact us. It can be tricky business. email@example.com
“..[I]t is actually impossible to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation without discriminating on the basis of sex…” wrote Chief Circuit Judge Diane P. Wood of the 7th Circuit Appeals Court, wiping away prior ambiguity surrounding Title VII protections based on sexual orientation. The 8-3 decision, held in a rare en banc hearing, arose out of Indiana professor Kimberly Hively’s lawsuit against her former employer Ivy Tech Community College. Hively claimed her denial of promotions, tenure and her eventual termination were because she is a lesbian.
The 7th Circuit completely bypassed the issue of Congressional intent of the word “sex” in Title VII. Judge Posner opined that the court was not the “obedient servants of the 88th Congress (1963-1965)” and the court was “[T]aking advantage of what the last half century has taught.”
This case matters beyond Illinois, Indiana and Wisconsin. This decision reflects what many state and local government have already done to protect LGBT workers, and similar cases will be heard in other circuits. Most importantly, it is a best practice to implement policies, procedures and training that prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation in the workplace.
We can help. Contact us at firstname.lastname@example.org or call 508.548.4888 to update your handbook and policies. Visit http://www.foleylawpractice.com for more resources.
-Attorney Timothy G. Kenneally
Retaliation protection in the workplace is defined by the “zone of interests” standard. If an employee falls within the interests sought to be protected under the law (Title VII) that employee is shielded against retaliatory adverse employment action.
A recent decision by the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (the “Commission”) in Schillace v. Enos Home Energy Therapy illustrates how the zone works. Schillace charge Enos with terminating her employment because her fiancé, who had also worked for Enos, had previously charged the company with retaliation. The Commission concluded that the fiancé relationship was “a close personal association” for Schillace, and therefore she was protected against any adverse employment action motived by or related to her fiancé’s claim. The Commission concluded that Schillace was entitled to back pay and damages for emotional distress due to the wrongful termination of her employment. In other words, she was in the zone of protection.
How should employers properly define the zone and react to it? For starters, employers must acknowledge that the focus on a zone of interests, in practice, creates a unique type of protection for each employee. This personalized zone is defined by any and all of the employee’s known close personal associations with members of protected classes. Close personal associations have been defined to include blood relatives, relatives by marriage, adoptive relations, and of course, a fiancé. However, we hesitate to suggest that a Court or the Commission will not define the group more broadly to include other persons closely tied to the employee.
Before taking adverse employment action, employers must consider all of the employee’s known close personal associations. Do any of those persons fall within protected classes? Can the adverse action be viewed as retaliation related to a person associated with the employee? Only through a measured and careful analysis, can an employer minimize its risk of running afoul of the ZONE.
If you have any questions about the zone of interests, feel free to contact me at email@example.com.